You are a typical brokerage client headed into a typical brokerage firm.1
You feel that you have a handle on stocks, but bonds strike you as more of a
mystery.2 You have heard that diversification would be wise, but you do not feel
that you know how to go about creating a diversified portfolio.3 The brokerage
firm assigns you to the stockbroker of the day. 4 The broker shows you an
investment profile questionnaire that asks you questions about your investment
knowledge, investment experience, investment objectives, federal tax bracket,

1

See National Association of Securities Dealers [NASD] Investor Information: The New
Account Agreement (2006), http://www.nasd.com (follow “Investor Information” hyperlink;
then follow “Investor Protection” hyperlink; then follow “Invest Wisely” hyperlink) (last visited
April, 23, 2006) (describing the typical services of a full-service brokerage firm); cf. Peter M.
Mundheim, The Desirability of Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: Challenges Facing
the Industry Regulators in the Wake of Mastrobuono, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 242 n.2 (1995)
(describing the common brokerage relationship).
2
The inverse relationship that bonds have with interest rates can be a mental hurdle for many
clients. When interest rates rise, bonds decline in value. The reasoning behind this concept can
be made fairly simple through an example. Imagine you purchase a bond paying 5% interest.
Interest rates rise and now a bond of the same length and risk as your bond is paying 6%. An
investor that comes onto the scene will obviously prefer the 6% bond. Thus, your 5% bond
becomes worth less, if sold on the open market, to account for this fact. However, the interest
rate movements will not affect the value of your principal if you hold the bond to maturity. If
you do not sell your bond on the open market, then you are entitled to the principal and fixed
interest rate from the borrower. See generally Vanguard: What the Past Teaches about Rising
Rates and Bond Prices (June 9, 2004),
https://flagship5.vanguard.com/VGApp/hnw/VanguardViewsArticle?ArticleJSP=/freshness/New
s_and_Views/news_ALL_risingrates_06092004_ALL.jsp.
3
See Erlich v. First National Bank of Princeton, 505 A.2d 220, 236 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1984) (stating that the generally accepted industry practice incorporates the principle of
diversification into investment recommendations).
4
See MSN Money (2005), http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/P124475.asp (last visited April,
23, 2006) (implying that walking into a brokerage firm unannounced will often cause you to
meet with the inexperienced broker of the day); see also Certified Financial Planner Board of
Standards, Inc. 5 (2006), http://www.cfp.net/Upload/Publications/187.pdf (noting that
“stockbroker” and “registered representative” are synonymous and distinguishing these titles
from that of “investment adviser”).
1

annual income, and liquid net worth.5 He suggests that in his experience, it would
be valuable to discuss these topics in some depth rather than just have you check
off the boxes.6 For instance, he notes that checking off “good” for investment
experience does not tell him whether you have ever invested in bonds. You hope
that the broker will know how to improve your financial situation, so you answer
the broker’s questions in blind faith.
This type of common exchange between stockbroker and client often leads
to the broker providing the client with specific investment recommendations.7
Unfortunately, those recommendations may fail to satisfactorily address the needs
of the client, and thus subject the broker to a suitability claim under National

5

See Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for That Little Old Lady: A Realistic Role
for Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 189, 274 (1998) (suggesting brokerage firms utilize an investment questionnaire in part
because it provides proof of a basis for the broker’s recommendations).
6
See NASD Obligations to Your Customer (2006), http://www.nasd.com (follow “Registration
& Qualifications” hyperlink; then follow “Broker Guidance & Responsibility” hyperlink; then
follow “Registered Representatives” hyperlink; then follow “Obligations To Your Customers”
hyperlink) (last visited April, 23, 2006) (stating that a broker’s initial responsibilities consist of
gaining a clear picture of his client’s financial situation and investment objectives).
7
A broker may also find it appropriate to refer the client to other experts, such as an estate
attorney, for more specialized financial needs. An estate attorney will often utilize a living trust
to help minimize a client’s estate taxes, avoid probate, and provide for a client’s unique estate
needs. See Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., supra note 4, at 3-4 (implying
that ethical financial professionals refer clients to estate attorneys when appropriate to perform
services such as wills, trusts and powers of attorney). Some brokerage firms offer a designated
beneficiary account that can serve to avoid probate, but it will not solve a client’s complex estate
planning needs. See schwab.com: Designated Beneficiary Plan Application,
http://www.schwab.com/cms/P-239303.0/des_ben_plan.pdf?cmsid=P-239303&refid=P1013592&refpid=P-999739 (last visited April, 23, 2006). See generally Gary C. Randall, Estate
Planning and Community Property, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 807 (1992). The broker may also refer
clients to accountants or insurance agents. See Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards,
Inc., supra note 4, at 3-4.
2

Association of Securities Dealers [NASD] Rule 2310.8 “Suitability” refers to a
broker’s obligation to have reasonable grounds, based on the client’s financial
situation, for believing recommendations he makes to the client are appropriate.9
The suitability test does not hinge on whether the client requests or consents to the
recommendations.10 Instead, the test centers around whether the stockbroker meets

8

NASD Rule 2310 (2006), available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html
(follow “Conduct Rules” hyperlink; then follow “2300 Transactions with Customers” hyperlink;
then follow “2310 Recommendations to Customers (Suitability)” hyperlink) (last visited April
23, 2006). This rule explains the requirements for the suitability of client recommendations:
(a) In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any
security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any,
disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial
situation and needs.
(b) Prior to the execution of a transaction recommended to a noninstitutional customer, other than transactions with customers where investments
are limited to money market mutual funds, a member shall make reasonable
efforts to obtain information concerning:
(1) the customer's financial status;
(2) the customer's tax status;
(3) the customer's investment objectives; and
(4) such other information used or considered to be reasonable by such
member or registered representative in making recommendations to the customer.
(c) For purposes of this Rule, the term "non-institutional customer" shall
mean a customer that does not qualify as an "institutional account" under Rule
3110(c)(4).
Id.
Id.; see also NASD Investor Information: Common Investor Problems and How to Avoid
Them (2006), http://www.nasd.com (follow “Investor Information” hyperlink; then follow
“Investor Protection” hyperlink; then follow “Investors’ Best Practices” hyperlink) (last visited
April 23, 2006) (noting suitability as one of the four most frequently reported claims).
10
Nancy E. Reich, Proof of Unsuitable and Unauthorized Trading by Securities Brokers, 28
AM. JUR. POF. 3D 87 § 7 (2005).
9

3

his fiduciary duty to provide recommendations that are in the best interests of the
client, even if those recommendations oppose the client’s wishes.11
Suitability claims represent the most common claim among securities laws
and perhaps the most difficult claim for arbitrators12 to get their arms around.13 In
particular, the challenge for arbitrators and lawyers in accurately assessing
suitability is to overlook the common misperception among investors that financial
loss represents the best indicator of whether a broker made unsuitable
recommendations.14 In making recommendations, the stockbroker actually has to
balance two competing risks: the downside risk of losing capital and the “risk” of

11

See John M. Reynolds, 50 S.E.C. Docket 504 (1991) (finding speculative investments were
unsuitable in this case and noting that “a broker is charged with making recommendations in the
best interests of his customer even when such recommendations contradict the customer’s
wishes”).
12
The majority of suitability cases today are heard in arbitration. See Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (noting courts have a duty to enforce
arbitration claims due to favored policy); see also NASD Arbitration & Mediation: Dispute
Resolution Statistics (2006), http://www.nasd.com (follow “Arbitration & Mediation” hyperlink;
then follow “NASD Dispute Resolution” hyperlink; then follow “Statistics” hyperlink) (last
visited April 23, 2006) (noting that there were 1,926 suitability cases in 2005). Unfortunately, a
written rationale is not required for arbitrator’s decisions causing there to be little evidence of
arbitrators’ reasoning in suitability cases. Lori J. Parker, Stockbroker Liability Litigation, 88
AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 § 40 (2005).
13
See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 BUS.
LAW. 1557, 1557 (1999) (stating that the NASD revealed to its members in 1998 through an
Avoidance and Prevention Advisory that suitability claims accounted for 95% of “filings under
NASD members' errors and omissions insurance policies . . . [and that] . . . ‘they are the most
common yet most ambiguous of all client accusations’” (quoting Zarb Urges Broker Dealers to
'Be on Guard' About Suitability, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 810 (May 29, 1998))).
14
See Implication of the Growth of Hedge Funds: Staff Report to the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission, 1466 PLI/CORP 209, 266 (2004) (describing how registered
investment companies, ironically, may be unsuccessful despite producing positive returns, and
successful despite producing negative returns because the returns need to be compared to the
overall performance of the market).
4

not meeting the investor’s future goals such as retirement. Growth investments
add value by diminishing the second “risk,”15 but in the past only the first risk has
typically been addressed in suitability claims.16 Because growth investments tend
to increase the first risk, fully understanding how growth investments should factor
in to the suitability test presents a major hurdle for the legal community.17 The
effect of this lack of understanding is inevitably a reoccurring misapplication of
liability and damages in suitability cases.
A broker’s liability cannot be understood without appreciating that truly
suitable recommendations may consist of more aggressive investments than the
client initially desires.18 An increased awareness in legal circles of the value of
aggressive investments is necessary and should have two divergent effects on
broker liability. On one hand, a broker who recommends growth investments
should find his potential liability has decreased because the legal profession no
longer solely focuses on financial loss.19 On the other hand, a broker who invests

15

See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 460 (2004)
(suggesting that maintaining a more conservative strategy diminishes an investor’s long-term
rate of return).
16
See Tracy A. Miner, Measuring Damages in Suitability and Churning Actions Under Rule
10b-5, 25 B.C. L. REV. 839, 840 (1984) (suggesting the standard model for assessing damages
under a 10b-5 claim compensated for actual losses sustained because of the fraud).
17
See Richard W. Nenno, Planning with Total-Return Trust Statutes, SK069 ALI-ABA 223, 230
(2005) (stating that despite some declines, equity investments “still offer the best long-term
growth prospects”).
18
See Reynolds, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19
See Miner, supra note 16 and accompanying text. See generally NASD Arbitration &
Mediation: Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 12 (noting that of the 1,610 arbitration cases
5

conservatively should discover his liability has potentially increased because his
recommendations may not be in the client’s best interest.20 The value of both of
these effects is that it causes brokers to have a substantially greater incentive to
invest aggressively enough to help millions of Americans come closer to their goal
of retirement.21 To coincide with this suggested new understanding of broker
liability, the standard for assessing damages must also adjust. Financial loss
should not be the true test for damages.22 The test should focus on the deviation in
performance between the unsuitable portfolio and a properly managed portfolio,
regardless of whether the client’s account increased or decreased in value.
Because growth investments tend to increase the risk of financial loss, the
recommended change of removing loss from the damages equation would again
increase brokers’ incentive to recommend growth investments and help clients
retire.
Part I of this Comment explains the history of the suitability claim including
the relevance of the shift from the federal courts to the arbitration tribunals. Part II

ultimately decided by arbitrators in 2005, clients won monetary damages or non-monetary relief
43% of the time).
20
See Reynolds, supra note 11 and accompanying text. See generally NASD Arbitration &
Mediation: Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 12; supra text accompanying note 19.
21
See Arthur Levitt, Former Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Public
Pension Investment Policy Conference: The SEC Today: An Accent on Individual Investors
(Mar. 20, 1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1996/spch090.txt
(noting the lack of savings by Americans and suggesting that the actual savings may be invested
too conservatively).
22
See Miner, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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describes the meaning of growth investments and argues they should have a more
prominent role in the suitability test. This section also suggests the universal goal
of retirement frequently causes aggressive growth investments to be in clients’ best
interest. Part III argues the current definition of suitability is inadequate because it
fails to provide arbitrators and securities lawyers with an understanding of how
stockbrokers consider growth when making a recommendation.23 Part III then
goes on to depict the best and worst practices for utilizing growth in investment
recommendations. Part IV demonstrates how the speed of arbitration and
mediation increase the need to diminish the ambiguity of the suitability test. Part
V recommends a simple solution: expand the definition of the current rule and
increase education for arbitrators. This section suggests the solution will properly
put growth investments and clients’ retirement needs at the forefront in arbitration.
Part VI provides real life examples to further demonstrate the problem, apply the
solution, and provide insight into concurrent claims that often complicate the basic
suitability claim. Finally, Part VII argues that damages are currently misdiagnosed
because of a lack of focus on the role of growth investments. Part VII suggests the
proper method for assessing damages would ignore whether the client’s portfolio
increased or decreased in value and focus solely on the portfolio’s deviation in
performance from a suitable portfolio.

23

NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8.
7

I. BACKGROUND
Traditionally, NASD Rule 2310 served as merely a starting point for
suitability claims. Case law made clear that it would take more than violating the
NASD’s suitability requirements for a client to have a valid legal claim against a
stockbroker.24 To have a valid legal claim, a client typically had to add a claim
under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.25 Rule 10b-5
compensated clients who had been defrauded through a broker’s untrue statement
or omission of a material fact.26 Thus, clients not only had to prove their broker’s
recommendations were unsuitable, but also that they had been defrauded by their
broker.27 However, that changed in 1987 when the forum for suitability claims
underwent a major shift from the federal court system to the arbitration tribunals.28
As a result of this change, the additional Rule 10b-5 requirement has essentially
disappeared.29
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Carroll v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004); see also Brown v. E. F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020,
1031 (2d Cir. 1993).
26
Parsons v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, 447 F. Supp. 482 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
27
Id.
28
See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (noting courts
have a duty to enforce arbitration claims due to favored policy).
29
See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 12, at 1584-85 (arguing that the shift to hearing
suitability cases in arbitration has brought on “a shift in the legal elements that must be proven to
establish a suitability violation, from fraud under Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
which requires scienter (or at a minimum recklessness) to a nebulous quasi-legal, quasi-ethical
test for breaches of standards of duty and care under SRO rules [NASD Rule 2310] which does
not require scienter or recklessness”); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?,
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1272 (1995) (noting that bringing claims that invoke the
25
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Ironically, this easier standard for clients has been initiated by brokerage
companies through mandatory arbitration clauses in brokerage account
agreements.30 Undoubtedly, the brokerage companies are enticed by the minimal
expense and time of an arbitration proceeding,31 but it comes with the price of
facing an arbitration panel that enforce the NASD Rule 2310 suitability standard
without any need for the client to prove fraud.32
Arbitration has provided an efficient alternative to the federal courts and has
sped up the process of resolving suitability claims.33 However, the advantages of
arbitration come with consequences as well. To maintain an expedient process,

antifraud provisions may have become obsolete because in arbitration “just and equitable
principles of trade can be the basis for recovery”).
30
See Richard A. Levan, National Regulatory Services 2nd Annual Conference on Suitability
For Traditional and Online Brokers: The Arbitration Litigation Landscape- Trends,
http://www.rlevan.com/about/nrs/nrs-10_01.htm (Oct. 4-5, 2001) (stating that many people view
arbitration under NASD rules as more client friendly than federal court). Sometimes, brokerage
firms do not require a client opening a cash account to sign an account agreement. In these
cases, the client will not have agreed to the mandatory arbitration provision within the
agreement. As a result, any ensuing suitability claim will end up in federal court: making the
federal antifraud provisions still relevant. However, this is the exception to the rule; most clients
are required to sign the account agreement. Thomas J. McCool, Securities Arbitration- Action
Needed to Address Problem of Unpaid Awards, GAO/GGD 00-115 ¶ 80 (June 15, 2000). This
Comment focuses on arbitration cases because they make up the majority of suitability cases
today. See id.; see also schwab.com: Investment Account Application 9,
http://www.schwab.com/ (follow “Account Types” hyperlink; then follow “Schwab One
Individual Account Download” hyperlink; then follow “Schwab One Account Application”
hyperlink) (last visited April 23, 2006) (providing required arbitration disclosures in bold in
section 15 of the account agreement).
31
See NASD Arbitration & Mediation (2006), http://www.nasd.com (follow “Arbitration &
Mediation” hyperlink; then follow “Start an Arbitration or Mediation” hyperlink; then follow
“Comparison Guide to Electing Mediation or Arbitration” hyperlink) (last visited April 23, 2006)
(stating that arbitration is faster and less expensive than litigation).
32
Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 12, at 1584-85; see also Reich, supra note 10 at § 3.
33
See NASD Arbitration & Mediation, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
9

discovery is limited,34 a written rationale for the decision is not required,35 and
oftentimes little information about an expert’s credentials is disclosed.36 Because
suitability claims regularly endure the shortcuts of arbitration, it is important to
ensure that arbitrators have a clear understanding of the intricacies of the suitability
claim. In particular, the role of growth investments must be better understood
because a stockbroker recommending growth investments increases his chance of
subjecting himself to a suitability claim, and yet growth investments have the
unique power to put millions of Americans in a better position to retire.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF GROWTH INVESTMENTS
A. Growth Hides in the Shadows of Risk in Arbitration
The term “growth” represents a specific investment objective listed as one of
the choices on a typical brokerage questionnaire.37 A client checking the box for
growth on the questionnaire signals to a stockbroker that the client desires to utilize
equity (stock) investments in order to achieve higher returns, and further that the

34

See C. Thomas Mason III, Challenging Experts in Securities Arbitration, 1196 PLI/CORP 725,
743 (2000).
35
Parker, supra note 12.
36
See Mason, supra note 34.
37
See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Suitability Claims and Purchases of Unrecommended
Securities: An Agency Theory of Broker-Dealer Liability, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 535, 588 n.157
(2005) (noting that Charles Schwab & Co., the largest discount brokerage company, lists capital
preservation, income, growth, and speculation as the investment objective choices on the account
application); see also George V. Cornell, III, Preparing Your Client for a Securities Arbitration
Hearing, 999 PLI/CORP 251, 255 (1997) (listing growth as a type of an investment objective
discussed with one’s broker); Rapp, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
10

client will accept the inevitable risk associated with such equity investments.38
Because the client may not recognize that he needs to take on risk to achieve
important long-term goals such as retirement,39 the prudent broker may need to
direct the client along a more aggressive path than the client initially considered.40
The problem is that lawyers41 and Self-Regulatory Organizations [SROs]
such as the NASD42 fail to sufficiently support the prudent broker in this “push” to
help clients achieve their long-term dreams. In fact, the legal community
emphasizes the reverse in assessing suitability and asks whether the broker took on
too much capital risk, rather than whether the broker took too little risk to achieve

38

See Nenno, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See Bernard Blum, Hearing on SEC Independence Rule Proposal: Outline of TestimonyRetirement and Pension Planning (Sept. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71300/testimony/blum1.htm (noting that retirement
planning complete with investment recommendations is one of the most widely offered services
amongst financial planners).
40
The “more aggressive path” refers to a path of growth investments. Growth differs from
speculation. Speculation represents another one of the investment objectives typically listed on
an investment questionnaire and is the box that a client should select if they intend to “gamble”
in the market. See Reynolds, supra note 11 and accompanying text; cf. Randall H. Borkus, A
Trust Fiduciary’s Duty to Implement Capital Preservation Strategies Using Financial Derivative
Techniques, 36 REALPPTJ 127, 142 (2001) (describing how the fiduciary of a trust may breach
his duty to future interested parties when utilizing a conservative investment strategy that
maximizes current income, yet fails to achieve sufficient growth).
41
See Securities Arbitration Commentator: Information for Investors,
http://www.sacarbitration.com/framecomm.htm (last visited April 23, 2006) (stating that due to
the fact that securities arbitration requires highly specialized lawyers, there “are relatively few
truly qualified advocates in this field”).
42
See NASD: Dispute Resolution Offers Alternative to Courts 10 (2005),
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/inv_info/documents/investor_information/nasdw_011944.pdf
(noting that the NASD handles close to 90% of all securities arbitration cases involving clients of
brokerage firms).
39
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the client’s needs.43 Due to the lack of emphasis on risk-taking as a positive and
worthy objective in the case of growth, the most important question gets lost in the
shuffle: Did the broker have “reasonable grounds”44 to take on risk so that he could
achieve growth for his client?45
The undeserved focus on financial loss in assessing suitability makes the
need for growth seem subservient to the need to manage risk.46 The public and the
brokerage industry would be better served if arbitrators and lawyers fully
understood that a prudent stockbroker must reflect on a client’s need for growth as
well as a client’s desire to minimize risk in the portfolio.47 Lawyers advocating on
behalf of a brokerage firm should be prepared to inform the arbitrators of the depth
of these competing interests and persuade the arbitrators that the degree of risk
taken was prudent.
The majority of suitability cases focus on the client’s financial loss,48 yet
sometimes a stockbroker’s recommendations may negatively affect the client’s
43

See Howard R. Elisofon & David M. Elkins, Evaluation of Arbitration Cases, 899 PLI/CORP
27, 37 (1995) (positioning the suitability of growth investments as a question of whether the
client knew of their inherent risk, rather than asking whether growth investments were necessary
to meet the client’s stated investment objectives).
44
See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8 (defining suitability as a broker’s obligation to have
reasonable grounds, based on the client’s financial situation, for any recommendations made to a
client).
45
Cf. Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43 and accompanying text.
46
Arbitrators generally rely upon the client’s actual financial loss to determine damages.
Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34.
47
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 611, 652 n.65 (1985) (implying that a suitable portfolio may experience volatility).
48
Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34; see also supra text accompanying note 46.
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potential for appreciation.49 Under these circumstances, the broker may not have
had reasonable grounds for believing the investments were suitable if the client had
a need for growth to meet his future goals.50 Lawyers representing clients should
consider initiating more cases in these instances. For this strategy to be effective,
arbitrators must not only consider the devastating impact of financial loss but also
the long-term effects of lost profits in assessing suitability.51 The definition of
suitability should incorporate the notion that stockbrokers have an obligation to
prevent a client’s portfolio from being too conservative as well as from being too
aggressive.52
B. Hypothetical Brokerage Case
To provide a look into how these competing interests play out in reality, let
us return to our hypothetical. The investment discussion begins with you
expressing uncertainty to the broker of how to invest a $50,000 bonus check that
you just received. You ask whether he has any suggestions. He responds that it
depends on the current mixture of your portfolio, your investment goals, and your

49

See, e.g., Borkus, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8; see also supra text accompanying note 44.
51
See Miner, supra note 16, at 862 (arguing that policy mandates that loss of market
appreciation be included in damages).
52
See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8 (requiring that a broker’s recommendations be reasonable
with respect to the client’s financial needs but omitting any reference to the types of needs a
broker must consider).
50
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risk tolerance.53 You discuss the questions from the investment questionnaire.
Over the course of the conversation, you reveal that you have $100,000 in balanced
mutual funds at XYZ Brokerage Company.54 In addition, you suggest to the
broker that you have fifteen years until retirement and your income should allow
you to not touch your investments until retirement. Finally, you state that your
goal in investing is to make some money.
The broker decides he has enough information to make recommendations.
He suggests all aggressive growth mutual funds for your bonus check and
recommends you consolidate your XYZ account55 so he can also begin to move
your balanced investments into aggressive growth mutual funds.56 You follow all
of his advice, but five years later when you look at your statement for the first
time, you realize that you have lost money. You decide to meet with a lawyer and
53

See NASD Prohibited Conduct, http://www.nasd.com (follow “Investor Information”
hyperlink; then follow “Investor Protection” hyperlink; then follow “Prohibited Conduct”
hyperlink) (last visited April 23, 2006) (implicating that suitability depends on the client’s
specific financial circumstances).
54
See Amy R. Doberman, Investment Company Names: Rule 35D-1 and Truth in Labeling,
1250 PLI/CORP 771, 780-81 (2001) (describing the requirements to be labeled a balanced mutual
fund).
55
One of a broker’s highest sales priorities is to convince a client to consolidate his outside
assets to the broker’s firm. Telephone Interview with John D. Keller, former Senior Vice
President, UBS, & former Branch Manager, Merrill Lynch (April 5, 2006). The broker then
hopes to earn money off of the consolidated investments. The advantages to consolidation
include fewer statements, less tax paperwork, and the potential for more premium services. The
disadvantages consist of no longer having access to the previous firm’s proprietary products,
investment research, and customized advice. Id.
56
Compare Richard W. Nenno, Planning With Dynasty Trusts, SG041 ALI-ABA 1597, 1672
(2001) (laying out a typical approach for aggressive growth with 95% equities and calling it
“maximum appreciation”), with id. at 1674 (describing a common balanced investment approach
with 50% bonds and 50% equities and describing it as “moderate growth”).
14

question whether you have a cause of action against the broker for unsuitable
recommendations.
In our hypothetical, you clearly appear to have a winning argument that the
investment recommendations were legally unsuitable. The facts seem fairly
straightforward that the broker was at fault for your financial loss. First, a client
with average investment experience and average investment knowledge trusted his
broker to provide him with appropriate recommendations. Next, the broker made
recommendations that increased the risk of the portfolio. Finally, the broker’s
recommendations caused the client to lose money after five years. However, the
presumption that a broker has made unsuitable recommendations if he causes
financial loss for a client is fundamentally flawed.57
This hypothetical demonstrates the common considerations a stockbroker
has to ponder in order to make suitable recommendations. First, the client has
some experience in mutual funds,58 but he has little understanding of how the

57

See Implication of the Growth of Hedge Funds: Staff Report to the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
58
An investor with limited experience in mutual funds should at least learn the difference
between no-load and load mutual funds. Load mutual funds charge an additional commission on
top of any standard charges that may be associated with no-load mutual funds. See
Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/no-loadfund.asp (last visited April 23,
2006) (noting that studies fail to show that load mutual funds outperform their counterparts,
which suggests that no-load mutual funds usually give you more for your money); see also J.
Julie Jason, Mutual Fund Share Classes: Uses and Abuses, 1327 PLI/CORP 27 (2002) (providing
an excellent explanation of the complexity of mutual fund fees and distinguishing Class A, Class
B, and Class C mutual fund shares).
15

bonds in his balanced mutual funds serve to mitigate the overall risk.59 Second,
despite the client’s limited knowledge on the impact of bonds, the client has a fair
amount of time and income to sustain more risk in his portfolio.60 Third, the client
may have tax considerations for the sale of his portfolio,61 but it may still be in his
best interest to accept the tax consequences in order to generate more growth in his
portfolio.62 Fourth, the client has stated an investment objective of retirement, and
thus the broker’s recommendations will need to help the client achieve this goal.
Finally, in this example, the broker will likely have a fiduciary responsibility to
monitor the investments on an ongoing basis,63 and therefore the broker needs to
continue to review the portfolio to ensure the initial recommendations have
remained suitable.
C. The Supervisor’s Obligations for Ensuring Suitability
The supervisor of the brokerage firm also has legal responsibilities to review
the broker’s recommendations for suitability.64 The supervisor is at the
59

See Richard L. Sandow, Risk Analysis in Suitability Cases, 1440 PLI/CORP 679, 691 (2004)
(noting that the interplay between different asset classes can mitigate the overall risk of the
investor’s portfolio).
60
See Now That The §404(c) Regulations Are Final, Who Cares?, 1 No. 11 ERISALR 15, 21
(1992) (noting that stocks outperform other investments over time).
61
See Internal Revenue Service, available at http://www.irs.gov/faqs/faq10-3.html (last visited
April 23, 2006) (describing how to calculate capital gains when selling a mutual fund).
62
See Zelinsky, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
63
See Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (stating that a fiduciary
relationship involves a breach of trust or confidence, but its scope cannot easily be defined).
64
See NASD Rule 3010(d)(1) (2006), available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html (follow “Conduct Rules” hyperlink; then
follow “3010 Supervision” hyperlink) (noting that a written, internal record should be
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disadvantage of not being privy to the conversations between the broker and client.
Thus, the supervisor will look for recommendations that seem to fall within the
acceptable range of investments given the categories checked by the client on the
questionnaire.65 If the investments do not seem to fall within the acceptable range,
then the supervisor will usually ask the broker for further information to explain
the discrepancies between the recommended portfolio and generally acceptable
advice given the client’s circumstances.66 In the above hypothetical, the client
suggested he was looking for growth. In many cases, a growth objective would be
sufficient for a supervisor to consider the recommendations of aggressive growth
mutual funds as suitable.67 It would not necessitate further inquiry by the

maintained that documents the reasonable supervisory review of all transactions by the members’
registered representatives); see also New York Stock Exchange [NYSE] Conduct Rules, Rule
405 (2006), available at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/NYSE_Rules/ (follow “General Rules”
hyperlink; then follow “Operation of Member Organizations” hyperlink) (defining supervisors’
obligation as “supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representatives of the
organization”).
65
The supervisor will also likely consider whether a general pattern exists amongst investment
recommendations made by the broker and whether the particular broker requires closer scrutiny.
See John H. Sturc & Jennifer J. Schulp, Enforcement Actions Regarding Variable Products, 884
PLI/COMM 353, 388 (2006) (describing a lack of supervision systems designed to assess patterns
of the stockbrokers as a “weak practice” according to examiners).
66
But see Securities Law Developments: Enforcement Developments Recent Failure to
Supervise Cases, 1108 PLI/CORP 33, 41 (1999) (arguing that if the supervisor has reason to be
suspicious, then he must investigate the matter extensively rather than solely rely on the broker’s
explanation).
67
See Sturc & Schulp, supra note 65, at 388 (noting that “sound practices” include requiring
stockbrokers to document every recommendation with a “suitability checklist that evidenced the
suitability determination”). However, a supervisor may find other information that counteracts
this conclusion such as notes by the broker that the client said he could not afford to lose more
than 5% of his portfolio. See id. at 391-92 (implying that if there are any red flags with respect
to the transaction, then the supervisor should look for objective information beyond what he is
told by the stockbroker).
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supervisor because the recommendations fall within the acceptable range of the
growth investment objective.68
D. Varying Examples of Growth
Growth symbolizes the client’s acceptance of potentially negative returns in
order to achieve higher performance.69 Growth covers a wide array of portfolios.
Consider two distinct portfolios that would both likely be considered growth
portfolios: Portfolio A comprised solely of ten individual stocks and Portfolio B
consisting of mutual funds with exposure to over 5,000 stocks and bonds. The risk
and diversification levels of these two portfolios differ substantially, but both
portfolios have the potential to outpace investments offering a fixed return,70 such
as Certificates of Deposit, Corporate & Municipal Bonds, and Treasuries.71
68

The supervisor must also consider the suitability of the broker’s recommendation to sell the
balanced mutual funds. Sometimes, a client will be subject to a back-end load and/or redemption
fee if a fund is sold earlier than a pre-determined period of time. A prudent supervisor will
assess whether the sale will cause the client to experience excessive fees. Heidi Stam & Judith
L. Gaines, Disclosure of Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, 1112 PLI/CORP 237, 245 (1999).
69
See NASD Invest Wisely: The Investment Decision, available at http://www.nasd.com
(follow “Investor Information” hyperlink; then follow “Investor Protection” hyperlink; then
follow “Invest Wisely” hyperlink) (last visited April 23, 2006) (noting that mutual funds may
lose value and higher expected return means higher risk).
70
Cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1519, 1521, 1540 (1997) (describing defined contribution plans as a form of pension plan
in which employees are the beneficial owners and suggesting that most of the participants in
these plans should seek to maximize growth given their long-term investment horizons, but
noting that most plans fail to do so because they underweight equity and overweight fixedincome securities and thus invest too conservatively).
71
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 240 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a certificate of deposit as “a bank
document showing the existence of a time deposit, usu. one that pays interest”); id. at 191
(defining a corporate bond as “an interest-bearing instrument containing a corporation's promise
to pay a fixed sum of money at some future time”); id. at 192 (defining a municipal bond as “a
bond issued by a nonfederal government or governmental unit, such as a state bond to finance
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Portfolio A and Portfolio B also have the potential to under-perform these fixed
instruments,72 even producing negative returns. Generally, negative returns
operate as the catalyst to clients initiating suitability claims.73
Despite the risks involved in stocks, stockbrokers and their supervisors
generally have an understanding that growth may be the most suitable portfolio
strategy for clients.74 In fact, a client’s best interest necessitates a broker
sometimes recommend growth investments to a client who initially chooses a more
conservative investment objective.75 Clients often have a substantial need for
growth in their portfolios to satisfy future needs76 even if they do not desire the risk
associated with stock investments.77 For instance, even the most dedicated worker

local improvements”); id. at 1539-40 (defining both a treasury note and a treasury bond as a
“debt security issued by the federal government . . . considered risk-free, but . . . [that usually
pays] relatively little interest”).
72
See Gordon, supra note 70, at 1541 (describing how equity investments may under-perform
fixed income investments over a certain period of time).
73
Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34; see also supra text accompanying note 46.
74
See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Corporate Governance: The Search For Solutions, U.S.F. L. REV. 695,
704-05 (1992) (noting that institutional investors had migrated portions of their portfolios into
diversified stock investments, due to research showing that these investments have outperformed
fixed income instruments over time).
75
See Reynolds, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
76
Retirement is not the only future need that clients should plan for years in advance. See, e.g.,
J. Timothy Philipps & Ed R. Haden, It’s Not Love, But It’s Not Bad: A Response to Critics of
Prepaid College Tuition Plans, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 281, 304 (1992) (pointing out the ongoing
challenge for parents striving to afford their child’s education because “[c]ollege costs have
historically risen at a rate about two percent greater than the general inflation rate”).
77
Therefore, even in the case of a risk-averse investor, the prudent stockbroker has to consider
that the client’s best interest may be to invest for aggressive growth. See Reynolds, supra note
11 and accompanying text.
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plans to retire when his health deteriorates.78 Retirement planning stands out
amongst future needs because of its universal nature. Unfortunately, statistics
show that Americans as a whole are only saving one third to one half of what they
will need for retirement.79 The lack of adequate savings is a rampant problem in
the United States.80 The general rule is that you will spend approximately 70% of
your pre-retirement income per retirement year.81 Clients seeking to sufficiently
fund their retirement stand a much better chance of meeting their goal through
growth investments than through more conservative strategies.82 Thus, insufficient
retirement funding magnifies the need for brokers to adequately incorporate
growth into investment recommendations.
E. The Potential Retiree

78

See CAO Institute, http://www.socialsecurity.org/quickfacts/ (last visited April 23, 2006)
(stating that “[b]y 2030, there will be 70 million Americans of retirement age—twice as many as
today”).
79
Levitt, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
80
Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction By Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2004) (stating
“[i]mperfect self-control . . . plagues consumption and savings decisions, accounting for the
rampant problem of insufficient saving for retirement”); see also David Wallechinsky, Is the
American Dream Still Possible?, PARADE, April 23, 2006, at 4, 4 (pointing out how “the savings
rate for Americans is the lowest it has been in 73 years”); Kathryn L. Moore, Partial
Privatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Effect on Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income
Workers, 65 MO. L. REV. 341, 403 n.49 (2000) (noting that “according to a 1993 telephone
survey by Merrill Lynch Consulting only 30% of women between the ages of 25 and 65 were
saving for retirement compared with 47% of men of the same ages”).
81
Fidelity.com: How Much You May Need at Retirement,
http://www.mysavingsatwork.com/atwork/1081430099016/1084856446098/1107928850703/110
8015368833.htm (last visited April 23, 2006) (suggesting that financial experts estimate you may
expect to spend an annual sum of between 60-80% of your pre-retirement income).
82
See Zelinsky, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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In our hypothetical, the client alluded to his plan to retire in fifteen years.
Although the client mentioned his plan to retire in passing, it is unlikely that he is
focused on his retirement planning fifteen years in advance.83 Clients do not
generally connect their current investment plan with such future goals and longterm needs; rather, they tend to over emphasize short-term performance.84 In light
of this fact, the broker needs to elicit the future needs of the client through
effective questioning. Although the typical stockbroker should not be expected to
provide a comprehensive financial plan,85 he should consider the client’s potential
to retire with adequate financial resources before determining the client’s
appropriate risk/reward level and making recommendations.

83

See Harvey Pitt, Former Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Written Testimony
Concerning Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public
Companies (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/032102tshlp.htm
(suggesting that in recent years clients have tended to ignore the long-term prospects of
investments, and instead expected short-term results).
84
Id.
85
See Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., supra note 4, at 2-3 (describing how
a financial “planner can look at all of your needs including budgeting and savings, taxes,
investments, insurance and retirement planning” . . . and stating that “[t]his big picture approach
to your financial goals may set the planner apart from other financial advisers”; see also U.S.
Securities & Exchange Commission: Financial Planners (July 29, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/finplan.htm (noting that with respect to financial planners, the
services offered, education background of the planner, and compensation structure may all vary
widely); Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA – 770, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 1 (Aug. 13,
1981) (discussing when financial planners are subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
A financial plan usually represents an a la carte product that can be purchased separately. A
stockbroker may utilize a financial plan to present a client with a comprehensive view of their
financial picture. Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., supra note 4 (p. 3). The
broker may be qualified to deliver the financial plan himself, or he may refer the client to one of
his colleagues that specializes in financial plans. Id. This in-depth product can complement
investment management, but it is neither a substitute for ongoing advice nor a mandatory
component of quality investment advisory services. See id.
21

Unfortunately, the typical broker does not have the expertise to weigh all the
factors that go into retirement planning before he makes a recommendation.86 For
instance, whether the client has paid off his mortgage would be a detail best left to
a financial planner.87 On the other hand, the stockbroker may learn some basic
information from the investment questionnaire and the client interaction to help
him at least take the client’s retirement goals into account. The acquired
information should help provide the broker with a general sense of whether the
client is on the path to adequately retire. In turn, the broker can approximate the
level of growth that will be necessary in the portfolio, and he can use that
information to generate appropriate recommendations.
In our hypothetical, the broker learned that you have $100,000 in balanced
mutual funds and $50,000 in cash. The broker was also told that you expect to
retire in fifteen years. Still, the broker needs to ask a few more questions before he
can take your retirement needs into account. Suppose that in response to the
broker’s further inquiries, you reveal that you currently make $100,000 a year, you

86

See Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., supra note 4, at 2-3, 5; see also
supra text accompanying note 85. See generally Arthur Levitt, Former Chairman, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Financial Literacy and Role of the Media (April 26, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch269.htm (noting that “[S]ixty-five
million American households will probably fail to realize one or more of their major life goals
because they have not developed a basic financial plan”) (emphasis added).
87
See Jennifer Bayot, As Bills Mount, Debt on Homes Rise for Elderly, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2004, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com (follow “Archives” hyperlink; then search
under “Headline” for “As Bills Mount”) (noting that Americans reaching the retirement age are
now less likely to own their homes outright).
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live off your entire income, you do not plan on having any future savings, and you
do not have any liquid assets88 other than the $150,000 already mentioned and
some emergency funds in a bank. The broker can now piece together that you only
have $150,000 to fund your retirement in fifteen years and that you rely on a
lifestyle that requires $100,000 a year in income.
The prudent stockbroker will likely consider your retirement needs in
relation to your expressed investment goals. You stated that your investment
objective was to make some money, and thus it may seem to the untrained
professional that your goals are in line with sufficiently funding retirement.
However, as the typical client, you meant that you want to make some money as
long as it does not entail much risk.89 You feel that you are in a comfortable
position because you pay off your credit cards, you make a decent living, you are
pleased that you have been able to save $150,000, and fifteen years strikes you as
being far off in the distant future.

88

See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don’t Need Another Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
397, 423 (1987) (explaining that liquid assets consist of those assets that can be rapidly
transferable into cash and thus have an easily determinable value).
89
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981) (describing human nature as risk averse when choosing
between potential gains). Unfortunately, a client’s natural aversion towards risk provides
stockbrokers with an incentive to be biased towards conservative investments in hopes of
keeping their clients satisfied. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor
Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 799 (2002) (describing how risk aversion
psychologically relates to regret, a feeling universally found among investors with suitability
claims). This potential bias increases the need for there to be a “push” from the legal community
to help clients retire.
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The prudent stockbroker sees a different picture. He envisions that you
would prefer to be able to invest more conservatively in retirement.90 Like most of
his other clients, he imagines that you would prefer to invest in fixed income
instruments during retirement that provide you with a recurring “paycheck.”91 To
reach your retirement goal, you will need to make approximately 70% of your
income, or $70,000 a year.92 Your broker believes that you may need $1.5
million93 upon retirement to make $70,000 a year in fixed income if today’s
historically low interest rates94 do not significantly rise before your retirement. He
recognizes that this goal is nearly impossible. He also reasonably believes that you
90

See Steven H. Sholk, ERISA and Federal Income Tax Aspects of Participant Directed
Investments in Defined Contribution Plans, 625 PLI/TAX 459, 626 (2004) (stating that clients
often shift their primary investment objective from growth to capital preservation as they near
retirement).
91
A common fixed income strategy is to ladder a bond portfolio such that each individual bond
matures in a different year. Ronald Harris, II, Investing in Municipal Bonds, 8-AUG. NBA
NAT’L B. ASS’N MAG. 9, 32 (1994). Under this approach, the broker will often purchase bonds
that pay out interest in different months in order to provide you with recurring income. The
principle reason brokers recommend this strategy is in order to reduce interest rate risk. See id.
Primarily, your broker wants to avoid the possibility of your entire portfolio maturing during a
period of lower interest rates and thus causing you to have a low return on your investment when
you reinvest. Id.
92
See Fidelity.com: How Much You May Need at Retirement, supra note 81 (suggesting that
financial experts estimate you may expect to spend an annual sum of between 60-80% of your
pre-retirement income).
93
See Kimberly Lankford, Kiplinger.com: $1 Million Nest Egg May Not Be Enough (July 30,
2004), available at http://www.kiplinger.com/personalfinance/about/archive/ (search under
“Search the Archive” for “$1 million nest egg”; then follow the “Kiplinger.com -/ Saving - $1
Million Nest Egg May Not Be Enough – July 30, 2004” hyperlink).
94
See Director of Fixed Income: Schwab Center for Investment Research, Don’t Fall Short on
Bonds (August 12, 2005),
http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/market_insight/investing_strategies/bonds/dont_fall_sho
rt_on_bonds.html?cmsid=P-895998&lvl1=market_insight&lvl2=investing_strategies&refid=P867031&refpid=P-463189 (demonstrating how despite recent rate hikes by the Federal Reserve,
long-term Treasury yields have actually flattened out providing investors with barely over a 4%
annual return for Treasury investments of maturities greater than ten years).
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will likely have an even greater shortfall if you invest in balanced mutual funds
rather than aggressive growth mutual funds.
F. More Challenges for the Potential Retiree
In addition, the prudent stockbroker recognizes more general concerns that
increase the need for your portfolio to include growth investments. The failure of
Social Security,95 inflation, the population’s increasing life expectancy,96 and
humans’ general aversion towards risk97 all fuel the need for the broker to make it
a priority to help you reach your retirement goals.
The first general concern is whether funds from Social Security will be
available for anyone in retirement other than today’s seniors.98 Social Security
continues to provide clients with little assurance that it will help with clients’
retirement. The plan is expected to have negative resources as early as 2017.99
President Bush seeks to provide Social Security participants with the choice to

95

See Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social
Security Privatization, 41 B. C. L. REV. 975, 1056 (2000) (noting that private long-term equity
investments reflect a more sensible retirement strategy than relying on the poor performing and
precarious system ironically named Social Security).
96
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 945 (8th ed. 2004) (defining life expectancy as “the period
that a person of a given age and sex is expected to live, according to actuarial tables”).
97
See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 89 and accompanying text.
98
See Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610-11 (1960) (holding that there is no absolute legal
right to Social Security benefits).
99
President George Bush, President Participates in Social Security Conversation in Maryland
(June 23, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050623.html.
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invest in growth in order to make up for the plan’s shortfall,100 but thus far Bush’s
strategy has failed to gain sufficient support.101 Unfortunately, no other
privatization plan for maximizing the return on Social Security funds through
investing for growth has been proposed by the legislature.102 As a result of the
expected shortfall and the lack of a widely accepted solution, investors should not
rely on Social Security to fund their retirement.
The second widespread effect on clients’ retirement funds is inflation. The
annual rate of inflation from 1913 to 2005 was 3.39%.103 Inflation increases the
amount of money that a client needs to have for retirement. For instance, in order
to reach your goal of retirement in fifteen years, if you will need $1.4 million in
today’s dollars to do so adequately, then inflation will likely cause your true need

100

See Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the Four “Truths” of Personal Social Security Accounts:
Evidence From the World of 401k Plans, 81 N.C. L. REV. 901, 912-13, n.39 (2003) (showing the
President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security recommends several stock mutual funds).
101
Brooke Oberwetter, Democrats Block Senate Vote on Personal Accounts 1 (Nov. 18, 2005),
available at http://www.socialsecurity.org/sstw/sstw11-18-05.pdf; see also Greg Anrig, Jr. &
Bernard Wasow, The Social Security Network: Twelve Reasons Why Privatizing Social Security
Is a Bad Idea (December 14, 2004), available at
http://www.tcf.org/Publications/RetirementSecurity/12badideas.pdf; John Kerry,
http://kerry.senate.gov/v3/issue/seniors.html (last visited April 23, 2006) (opposing President
Bush’s plan because he argues it will create up to $2.2 trillion in debt). But see Cato Institute,
http://www.socialsecurity.org/quickfacts/ (last visited April 23, 2006) (stating that the current
rate of return on Social Security Taxes is less than 2% for the average worker).
102
Bobby Lewis Dexter, Tax Terrorism: Nasty Truths about Investor Control Theory and the
Accommodation of Social Security Privatization, 57 MERCER L. REV. 553, 579 (2006).
103
InflationData.com (2006),
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/inflation_rate/AnnualInflation.asp (last visited April, 23, 2006).
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to be over $2.30 million.104 Another way to look at it is that the actual return you
will receive on your investments is lower than the published returns. For instance,
the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security estimated a 6.5% annual
return for stocks after inflation.105 In contrast, the reported average return of the
S&P 500 Index,106 a common measure for stock investments, stands between 10
and 12%.107 In addition, the Commission estimated just over a 3% annual return
for bonds after subtracting inflation.108
Although both growth and fixed income instruments produce a lower actual
return when considering inflation, if a client receives a mere 3% actual return in
bonds, then it should become clearer why the client often needs to invest in growth
to meet his retirement goals. For instance, let us assume that you expect to retire
after 25 years and you plan to invest your $150,000 in bonds both before and
104

The figure of $2.30 million is calculated based on the historic inflation rate of 3.39%
remaining constant over the fifteen year period. However, in reality, inflation will vary and the
deviations will alter this figure.
105
Medill, supra note 100, at 930.
106
The S&P 500 Index cannot be perfectly duplicated through an investment. Iman Anabtawi,
Some Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 598 n.82 (2006).
However, there are two ways to mirror the index’s returns: a mutual fund or an Exchange-Traded
Fund [ETF]. ETFs trade on the exchange like a stock, and yet they still offer the inherent
diversification found in a mutual fund. An investor should consider ETFs over mutual funds
when they have a lump sum to invest because the annual operating expense of ETFs tends to be
substantially lower. Conversely, an investor repeatedly buying into the market will usually find
the cost of commissions on ETFs to be more expensive than buying mutual funds that do not
have a transaction fee. See generally Peter N. Hall, Bucking the Trend: The Unsupportability of
Index Providers’ Imposition of Licensing Fees for Unlisted Trading of Exchange Traded Funds,
57 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1126-31 (2004).
107
Thomas Pavlick, Analyzing the Effects of Transaction Cost, Leverage and Sector
Concentration on Portfolio Performance, Portfolio Risk, and Client Suitability, 1327 PLI/CORP
9, 15 (2002).
108
Medill, supra note 100, at 930-31.
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during retirement. A 3% annual return on $150,000 would provide you with just
over $314,000 in 25 years.109 For this plan to be a sound strategy, $314,000 needs
to generate a sufficient income for you in retirement. Unfortunately, a 3% return
on $314,000 would give you only approximately $9,400 a year in income, and thus
this strategy would fall drastically short of providing you with the $70,000 annual
income you will likely need in retirement. This significant shortfall suggests that
you will need to save additional funds if you are to completely satisfy your
retirement goal. However, even without additional savings, you would have at
least been closer to meeting your goal had you invested in riskier investments such
as equities, given their historic annual rate of return of 6.5%.
Third, people’s life expectancy has dramatically increased to the point that
the general population may be expected to live to over 100 years old in the near
future.110 Assuming clients do not plan to increase their retirement age, an increase
in life expectancy implies that clients must be prepared to fund their living
expenses for a much greater period of time. The figures represent a large
percentage increase, possibly doubling the number of years clients will have in
109

The figure of $314,000 is calculated based on the historic bond rate of 3% remaining
constant over the fifteen year period. However, in reality, returns will vary and the deviations
will alter this figure.
110
See Dilley, supra note 95, at 1054-1055 (stating that “[p]redictions of genetic breakthroughs
that promise regular and healthy lifespans of over 100 in the near future mean increased
uncertainty about the length of time retirement income will be needed”); see also Kimberly
Lankford, Kiplinger.com: Overestimate Your Life Expectancy (Aug. 11, 2004), available at
http://www.kiplinger.com/personalfinance/columns/ask/archive/2004/q0811.htm (suggesting that
many financial planners estimate a life-span of over 100 years).
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retirement.111 This life-span increase diminishes the chance clients will be able to
live off of their principal rather than live off of their return on investment. Thus,
the client must have sufficient funds come retirement to generate an adequate
return. Growth investments will often be necessary to achieve sufficient funds
come retirement.
Finally, social studies have found human nature to be generally risk averse
when choosing between potential gains.112 These studies imply that a client left to
his own devices will tend to steer clear of investments that entail more risk.
Growth investments necessarily include an element of risk because they do not
have a fixed rate of return,113 and yet growth investments are essential in many
cases for a client to meet his retirement goals. Thus, the stockbroker plays an
important role in keeping a client on track towards meeting his retirement goal, and
the suitability test must recognize this role.
III. SUITABILITY
A. NASD Conduct Rule 2310 Drives the Law
Because a prudent stockbroker must strongly consider whether growth
investments would help fulfill a client’s retirement needs, it seems only natural that
111

Assume a client was planning on retiring at 65, and he was previously expected to live until
age 80 (15 years). If he was now supposed to live until 100 (20 more years), then there would be
over a 100% increase in his number of retirement years.
112
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 89; cf. Moore, supra note 80, at 357-59 (finding that
certain groups such as lower-income workers, women, and blacks may tend to be more riskaverse with their investments than the general population).
113
See NASD Invest Wisely: The Investment Decision, supra note 69.
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the suitability test should apply the same principle.114 Therefore, the test should at
least note that a broker must weigh a client’s need for future retirement funds
against the competing interest of managing risk. Unfortunately for members of the
legal community untrained in investment advice, NASD Rule 2310 falls short of
providing such extensive guidance.115 Nevertheless, NASD Rule 2310 serves as a
bridge between the investment community and the legal community for assessing
the suitability of investment recommendations. It provides the common law with a
general definition of what it means for a stockbroker to have made a suitable
recommendation. The rule requires the broker to make reasonable efforts to learn
about certain crucial facts concerning the client’s financial situation before making
any recommendation.116 In addition, the rule demands stockbrokers “have
reasonable grounds for believing the recommendation is suitable for such customer
upon the basis of the [financial] facts, if any, disclosed by such customer . . . .” 117
The NASD test for suitability utilizes the typical legal standard of
reasonableness.118 For those professionals well-versed in the investment industry,

114

“Having enough money for retirement is a major problem for today’s investors. If the legal
system could help by promoting growth for individual investors, then that would be a giant leap
forward.” Telephone Interview with John D. Keller, supra note 55.
115
NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8; see also supra text accompanying note 44.
116
NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8.
117
Id.
118
Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984) (noting that for the court to find
ineffective assistance of counsel, the plaintiff must overcome “a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” and “show
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this serves as an acceptable test. However, the standard provides little guidance, if
any, on the competing considerations a broker must weigh when making a
recommendation.119 For example, the suitability test leaves out any mention of the
obligation of stockbrokers to balance the inherent risk found in growth
investments, versus the risk that clients, without sufficient growth investments, will
have a shortfall when it comes time to meet their retirement goals. Therefore, the
test leaves the legal community out in the cold when trying to determine how a
prudent stockbroker analyzes a client’s financial circumstances. If arbitrators were
provided with more guidance under NASD Rule 2310 to help them understand the
analysis that the prudent broker carries out prior to making a recommendation, then
they would be more likely to adequately determine whether in fact this broker had
“reasonable grounds” for believing the investment was suitable.120
Unfortunately, in legal practice and in scholarly articles, the application of
the suitability rule has focused too much on the desire to limit risk and too little on

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different”) (emphasis added).
119
See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8 (requiring that a broker’s recommendations be
reasonable with respect to the client’s financial needs but omitting any reference to the types of
needs a broker must consider).
120
See Stuart D. Root, Suitability – The Sophisticated Investor – And Modern Portfolio
Management, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 287, 292-93, 295-96 (1991) (noting that a 1963
Special Study found that the NASD “should provide further definition of content” with respect to
suitability but that the request was “largely ignored by the NASD”).
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the need for growth.121 Given that human nature tends to be risk averse,122 it
should probably come as no surprise that the legal community continues to imply
losses are the only real tragedy that comes from unsuitable investment
recommendations.123 To the contrary, it is equally tragic when individuals cannot
have leisure time to enjoy the fruits of their years of hard work because their
investments did not achieve enough growth to adequately retire. Imagine a fortyyear veteran of the workforce asks his stockbroker at age 65 whether he has
sufficient funds to retire. The broker sadly informs the client that he had been
investing conservatively, and due to this rate of return, the client will have to work
another fifteen years before he can retire. This risk rings true for many potential
retirees, and yet it can be minimized through the broker recommending more
suitable investments along the way.
B. Modern Portfolio Theory Drives Investment Strategy
The minimal guidance provided by NASD Rule 2310 leaves ambiguous the
question of whether a specific recommendation is unsuitable.124 Because the legal
standard is ambiguous, the legal profession relies on industry experts to provide
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See Pavlick, supra note 107; see also Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34; supra text
accompanying note 46.
122
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 89 and accompanying text.
123
Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34; see also supra text accompanying note 46.
124
Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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clarification of what is suitable.125 Modern Portfolio Theory provides the
predominant industry view that every investment should be considered in relation
to the whole.126 In addition, the theory relies upon asset allocation127 to imply that
a broker should recommend diversification in the overall portfolio to minimize the
client’s risk.128 Arbitrators can appreciate the need for diversification more easily
than the need for growth investments because diversification seeks to minimize the
risk of capital loss and capital loss has been the main focus of damages in the
past.129 However, diversified investments can still be allocated aggressively or
conservatively, so whether investments are diversified does not conclude the
analysis. Unfortunately, in the end, arbitrators favor brokers that error towards a
conservative asset allocation, even when more aggressive investments are in the
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Richard A. Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and Using Spread to
Measure Risk, 54 BUS. LAW. 1599, 1617 (1999).
126
Jerry W. Markham, Privatizing Social Security, 38 SAN. DIEGO L. REV. 747, 798 (2001)
(noting the wide acceptance of Modern Portfolio Theory).
127
See Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 777, 796 (2000) (defining asset allocation as the distribution of money between the
major asset classes: stocks, bonds, and cash).
128
See Bradley P. Rothman, 401(k) Plans in the Wake of the Enron Debacle, 54 FLA. L. REV.
921, 934 (2002) (implying that Modern Portfolio Theory is used to implement a diversified
strategy and minimize risk). Thus, even when investing for growth, the broker should still seek
to minimize the inherent risk within growth investments through diversification. Unfortunately,
diversification is barely hinted to in the current NASD rule. NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8.
NASD Rule 2310 should highlight growth investments because they are at odds with the risk of
capital loss. In doing so, the rule should note for clarification purposes that the need for growth
should not cause a broker to ignore the principle of diversification. See infra Part V.
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Michael E. Murphy, The ESOP at Thirty: A Democratic Perspective, 41 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 655, 662 (2005); Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34; see also supra text accompanying
note 46.
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client’s best interest.130 Furthermore, arbitrators currently have little reason to
focus on how aggressive investments help clients retire because a broker’s failure
to recommend these growth investments does not currently subject the broker to a
suitability claim.131
One way to consider Modern Portfolio Theory is that if you combine
aggressive investments with conservative investments, then you will often end up
with a moderate portfolio. Adding even some growth investments to a portfolio
will increase the client’s chances of meeting his future goals such as retirement.132
This example demonstrates that under Modern Portfolio Theory, recommending
aggressive growth investments may be entirely appropriate for a moderate
investor.133
Based on Modern Portfolio Theory, the suitability of growth investments
depends on the investments’ role within the overall portfolio. Therefore, the
recommendation to purchase just three technology growth stocks for a client may
seem unsuitable on the surface because the broker’s suggestion seems to fail to
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See Miner, supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Robert E. Scott & George G.
Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1428, 1491 n.126 (2004) (noting that investors “can choose their desired portfolio risk
by altering their asset allocation between risky and risk-free assets”).
131
See Miner, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
132
See Zelinsky, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
133
See Rapp, supra note 5, at 192-93 (suggesting that under Modern Portfolio Theory a risky,
growth investment may not only be deemed suitable for a portfolio with investment objectives of
safety and income, but may in fact be a wise recommendation).
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utilize asset allocation.134 However, if the technology stocks increase the client’s
exposure in the technology sector to a level that makes the client’s overall portfolio
consistent with technology exposure in the S&P 500,135 then the recommendations
may be a very appropriate fit.136 This is true even if the client’s overall portfolio
does not reside with the broker making the recommendations.137 In other words, if
the broker only manages the three technology stocks for the client, but he is also
aware of how these investments balance out the investments at ABC Brokerage
Company, then the recommendations may be legally suitable.138
For a broker to implement Modern Portfolio Theory, he needs to know about
the client’s entire portfolio.139 Inquiring about a client’s other investments is
mandatory because NASD Rule 2310 requires the broker to make reasonable
134

See Hu, supra note 127, at 796 (defining asset allocation as the distribution of money
between the major asset classes: stocks, bonds, and cash, and noting that asset allocation
accounts for approximately 80-90% of a portfolio’s actual performance).
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See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 803-04 (2002)
(implying the S&P 500 represents a broad stock market index covering numerous sectors).
136
See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of Ethics and Risk in
Securities Law, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 525 (2003) (suggesting that recommending technology
stocks may be suitable for an investor with an objective of long-term growth, but that the
recommended exposure likely needs to be for a reasonable portion of the portfolio).
137
See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8 (stating that the broker should consider other security
holdings revealed to him, and omitting any requirement that those investments be directly held
by that broker). Because NASD Rule 2310 does not explicitly make the subtle point that the
domicile of the investments is immaterial, the broker that recommends all aggressive
investments can easily appear reckless in the eyes of the arbitrators. Id.
138
Id.
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See Michael T. Johnson, Note, Speculating on the Efficacy of “Speculation”: An Analysis of
the Prudent Person’s Slipperiest Term of Art in Light of Modern Portfolio Theory, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 419, 427 (1996) (noting that Modern Portfolio Theory necessarily analyzes investments in
relation to the entire portfolio).
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inquiries to learn of the client’s financial situation.140 Unfortunately, in some
cases, the broker may not be able to acquire enough information about the client’s
portfolio even after reasonable inquiry.141
In our hypothetical, the client walked into the stockbroker’s place of
business, presumably with goals in mind. In this case, it was a natural progression
for the client and stockbroker to work together to create an overall portfolio
strategy.142 This makes the job easier for the broker to recommend suitable
investments. Yet, many stockbrokers have to generate new business through
prospecting.143 The greatest challenge in applying Modern Portfolio Theory comes
from the case of the new client obtained through solicitation by cold-call or
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NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8.
In a new relationship with a broker, fear will often prevent a client from fully trusting the
broker. Telephone Interview with John D. Keller, supra note 55. The client may fear that if he
reveals his outside holdings to the broker, then the broker will pressure him into transferring all
of his assets to the broker. Id. This is probably a well-founded fear. However, the client’s
“secrets” prevent the broker from being able to fully understand the client’s diversification needs
or the tax consequences of a purchase or sale. Id. With respect to the latter, realized gains are
offset by realized losses, even if they do not come from the same brokerage account.
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One of the common obstacles for a broker looking to implement an effective strategy is
convincing an investor to diversify a concentrated stock position. A concentrated position is
usually considered to consist of 20% or more of your holdings in one individual stock position.
Many investors have large stakes in their employer’s stock. Sadly, many investors choose to
ignore the fact that their employer’s stock offers the same type of risk that diversification is
designed to avoid. Id.
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See Rapp, supra note 5, at 217 (suggesting that at the typical brokerage house, stockbrokers
are trained more in sales than in how to make suitable investment recommendations).
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seminar.144 In this case, it is the broker that seeks out the client, rather than vice
versa.
C. Sales Drive the Stockbroker
When a broker proactively prospects, he may tend to focus on the sale,
instead of the client’s actual needs. As a result, a danger exists that a broker will
recommend growth investments solely for the purpose of proving his worth to the
client. It is important to make clear that “the need for growth” does not make
every growth recommendation suitable. At a minimum, the recommendation
needs to be tied to the client’s future goals.
For instance, reasonable inquiries by a broker may uncover little information
about the details of a client’s actual portfolio because the typical client will be
reluctant to trust a solicitor.145 Still, the client may agree to test the broker out with
a small portion of his portfolio to assess the broker’s ability to achieve good
performance.146 In this case, the client only wants to see how well the broker
knows the market, rather than be given customized recommendations.
144

Investment seminars usually begin by the stockbroker advertising in a newspaper or through
a mailer. The advertisement will usually promote some investment topic thought to be of interest
to wealthy prospects, such as estate planning. Ultimately, the broker will attempt to turn the
prospect into a client through setting up a one-on-one meeting.
145
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 43, at 651 (suggesting that a client that has not been
convinced of a broker’s abilities will more likely test the broker by monitoring the broker’s
decisions). See generally NYSE Conduct Rules, Rule 405, supra note 60 (stating the rule known
in the industry as “Know Your Customer” because it requires a broker to use due diligence to
obtain basic information about every client).
146
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 47, at 651; see also supra text accompanying note
145.
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Nevertheless, neither the lack of client information available to the broker nor the
client’s stated objective should change the stockbroker’s approach.147 It is usually
considered unsuitable to recommend extremely risky investments for the entire
portfolio even when it is the client’s desire.148 Thus, the broker still must apply
asset allocation and Modern Portfolio Theory to the extent possible.149 This
ensures that the advice is tailored to the client’s unique circumstances150 and that
the client’s risk is kept to a minimum.151
A standard sales pitch in the investment industry has been for a broker to ask
a prospect to give the broker a chance based on one stock.152 In this case, the
broker does not learn enough about the client’s outside assets in order to properly
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The broker’s approach still needs to consist of attempting to learn at least the client’s basic
financial circumstances. Arbitrators should not tolerate “loose cannon” brokers that recommend
un-customized growth investments to win business.
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See Reynolds, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
149
A broker who has very little information about the client’s outside assets has to treat the
client’s portfolio as completely devoid of diversification. The broker must assume that none of
the client’s outside assets will balance out the broker’s recommended investments. This
conservative approach avoids any risk of the broker making false assumptions about the client’s
diversification needs.
150
Even though the broker is in the dark about the client’s outside assets, he still needs to learn
some basic information about the client in order to utilize Modern Portfolio Theory and asset
allocation. The broker will have to uncover the basic information of the client’s true risk
tolerance, overall investment objective, and time-frame. This will guide the broker in
determining between asset allocation models such as moderate and aggressive. If the broker can
not learn this information from the client, then he is not in a position to make any
recommendations.
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See generally Johnson, supra note 139 (noting that Modern Portfolio Theory necessarily
analyzes investments in relation to the client’s entire portfolio while seeking to reduce overall
volatility).
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See Gedicks, supra note 37, at 555 (noting that the typical broker/client relationship starts
with the broker utilizing salesmanship to sell a particular investment).
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utilize Modern Portfolio Theory.153 He simply recommends one “hot” growth
stock without regard to the rest of the portfolio.154 Seemingly, the need for growth
in this one stock is tied to proving the broker’s worth as an expert, not the client’s
future needs such as retirement.155 The broker has incentive to recommend a risky
investment and hope that it will achieve high performance and impress the client.
Even if the broker eventually plans to advise the client prudently, the idea
that the broker needs to prove his ability to predict market performance may be
doing the client a disservice. It is highly unlikely that even a stockbroker has the
capabilities to outthink the market, and thus he should not pretend to have a
“crystal ball” ability in order to win business.156 The broker should provide the
client with reasonable expectations about how he may help. He should explain that
his expertise derives from his ability to implement an investment strategy based on
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See Rapp, supra note 5, at 272-73 (arguing that Modern Portfolio Theory and real world
practices such as cold-calling demand that the suitability test be understood to apply differently
to stand-alone and portfolio recommendations).
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See William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?,
54 EMORY L.J. 843, 898 (2005) (implying that chasing hot stocks is an investment strategy
reserved for amateurs).
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See Newman v. Rothschild, 651 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that when an
stockbroker talks about hot stocks or how his primary objective is to make money for the client,
a reasonable investor should interpret that as nothing more than a sales pitch).
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See Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?—Derivative
Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 NW. U.
L. REV. 987, 1037 n.9 (1992) (explaining that advocates of the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis [ECMH] believe the efficiency of the marketplace makes it nearly impossible for
anyone to outperform the market, and noting that a sub-theory of ECMH, the Random Walk
Theory, holds that future market movements are random).
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the client’s financial circumstances.157 This is in fact what the suitability test calls
for from the broker.158
IV. THE CHALLENGE IN ARBITRATION & MEDIATION
Claims against brokerage firms are typically decided by arbitration159
through the NASD.160 Arbitrators typically have as little as two to three days to
hear the evidence on whether the broker made suitable recommendations.161 The
speed of arbitration magnifies the risk that any lack of understanding on the part of
arbitrators will lead to an incorrect decision. Thus, an important question remains
157

A stockbroker may hold more than the basic licenses or certifications necessary to
recommend investments. These designations are not required for a broker to do his job, but they
do demonstrate that he has enhanced education in his field. For instance, a broker may be a
Certified Financial Planner (CFP) or a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA). A CFP has expertise
in reviewing areas typically found in a financial plan, such as estate planning, but this
certification is unnecessary to deliver financial plans. A CFA has expertise in analyzing
individual stocks. There are three levels of CFA, yet none of these levels are necessary for a
broker looking to recommend the purchase or sale of a stock. See Certified Financial Planner
Board of Standards Inc., http://www.cfp.net/ (last visited April 23, 2006); see also CFA Institute,
http://www.cfainstitute.org/ (last visited April 23, 2006).
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See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8 (defining suitability as a broker’s obligation to have
reasonable grounds, based on the client’s financial situation, for any recommendations made to a
client) (emphasis added).
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See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (noting courts
have a duty to enforce arbitration claims due to favored policy). See generally Jean R.
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1636-37 (2005)
(describing the shift towards enforcing mandatory arbitration in the securities industry).
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See NASD: Dispute Resolution Offers Alternative to Courts, supra note 42; see also Rapp,
supra note 5, at 191 (noting that suitability claims consistently rank amongst the top claims
against brokerage firms).
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See SEC, NASD and Securities Law Information Center, http://www.sec-nasdregulations.com/process.htm (last visited April 23, 2006) (noting that the average arbitration case
takes between six to twelve months from start to finish, and that most hearings only last between
two to three days); see also Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int’l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d
Cir. 1967) (noting that the basic purpose of arbitration is to quickly resolve cases and avoid
extended litigation); NASD Arbitration & Mediation, supra note 31 (stating that arbitration is
“faster, less expensive, and less formal than litigation”).
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whether arbitrators have a clear understanding about the need for growth in clients’
portfolios.162 To evaluate this question, let us return to our hypothetical.
Unfortunately, you put blind faith in your stockbroker five years ago, and his
advice has caused your portfolio to decline in value over that stretch of time. Now,
five years later, you find yourself awaiting arbitration to bring a claim against your
broker for recommending unsuitable investments. While the date for your
arbitration hearing is pending, your lawyer suggests that you utilize mediation to
attempt to reach a fair settlement and circumvent the ensuing costs of arbitration.163
In mediation, a neutral third party trained in negotiation will help both sides come
to a mutual agreement.164 You realize that this means you need to rely on your
lawyer to fully appreciate the value of your claim. If your lawyer does not realize
the strengths of your claim, then you may not reach a fair settlement. If your
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See Securities Arbitration Center: Unsuitability,
http://www.securitiesarbitration.us/stockbrokerdisputes.htm.html (last visited April 23, 2006)
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Education: When Should You Complain?,
https://apps.nasd.com/Investor_Information/Complaints/complaintCenter.asp (last visited April
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See NASD Mediation, http://www.nasd.com (follow “Arbitration & Mediation” hyperlink;
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visited April 23, 2006) (noting that mediation may run concurrent with pending arbitration and
most parties agree that mediation results in time savings and cost savings); see also NASD
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follow “Mediation” hyperlink; then follow “Mediation: An Alternate Path” hyperlink) (last
visited April 23, 2006).
41

lawyer does not realize any weaknesses in your claim, then the other side may balk
at the offer and force you to pay additional arbitration costs. In other words, if
opposing counsel fully appreciates the need for growth in investments but your
lawyer does not, then your decision to hire this lawyer could be a costly mistake.
You choose not to settle at mediation, so you and your attorney have to
prepare for arbitration. Your lawyer explains to you that arbitration still has
advantages over litigation because it is faster and less expensive.165 To get ready
for the arbitration hearing, your lawyer has helped you gather all documentation
necessary to prove your case including your brokerage statements, a copy of the
initial investment questionnaire you had completed, and any emails you received
from your broker.166 Your lawyer informs you that besides documentation it will
come down to a battle of experts. The experts will opine on the suitability of the
investment recommendations.167
The expert plays an even more pivotal role in arbitration cases than in
litigation because of the limited time involved for just a few arbitrators to come to
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See NASD Arbitration & Mediation, supra note 31.
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a conclusion about suitability.168 There is tremendous potential for experts to have
undue influence on arbitrators. As one Certified Financial Planner put it:
Unfortunately, too many securities arbitrators today don't know
what weight an expert's testimony deserves. The picture of the
arbitrator as a neutral informed person experienced in the securities
field is a myth. Some arbitrators apparently have never held a
brokerage account . . . . However well-intentioned they are, many
arbitrators are unable to discern how they are being bamboozled by a
polished, smooth expert with impeccable credentials.169
The risk of a mistaken decision is greatly enhanced by the limited information
experts are forced to provide about their credentials in arbitration relative to
litigation. In litigation, an expert must provide a written report prior to trial
expressing his qualifications and any compensation that he will receive.170 The
report also must include the opinions the expert will articulate and the rationale and
data behind any of his opinions.171 Furthermore, any expert expected to present at
trial must submit to a deposition.172 These pre-litigation procedures provide the
other side with time to challenge any suspect expert testimony. Conversely, in
arbitration none of these initial procedures are required. The opposing lawyer is
usually provided with little information about the expert’s credentials or
168

See NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure: Composition of Arbitration Panel 6 (2005),
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/med_arb/documents/mediation_arbitration/nasdw_013098.pdf
(noting that claims under $50,000 are usually overseen by one arbitrator and claims above
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opinions.173 Even the little information provided about the expert may become
entirely worthless if arbitrators continue to allow counsel to change experts at the
last minute.174 In addition, arbitration provides no remedy when arbitrators
mistakenly accept unreliable or irrelevant expert testimony.175
Experts have an opportunity to play a major role in arbitration cases in part
because of the limited experience of arbitrators. Neither litigation experience nor
brokerage experience are required to become an arbitrator. In fact, a majority of
the arbitrators in a dispute with a client are required to be from outside the
brokerage industry.176 Arbitrators consist of your typical working professionals.
The NASD’s goal is “to recruit arbitrators from different backgrounds, such as
educators, accountants, lawyers, business and securities professionals, and
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Mason, supra note 34, at 742-43.
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3,692 public arbitrators and 2,648 industry arbitrators for a combined total of 6,340).
174
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others.”177 Furthermore, these professionals do not need to be seasoned veterans.
The NASD only requires arbitrators to have five years of business or professional
experience and two years of college-level credits.178 Therefore, even if some
arbitrators have substantial knowledge and experience, the minimum threshold
suggests at least some arbitrators may be duped by a sophisticated expert.
Lastly, the finality of the arbitration process increases the importance of
getting the decision right. Arbitration decisions are almost never overturned.179
The reviewing court cannot overturn a decision it believes to be incorrect or even
unreasonable.180 Magnifying the concern of an erroneous decision, arbitrators are
not even required to disclose their reasoning.181 This makes it more challenging
for the reviewing court to assess the validity of the decision and provides the losing
party little assurance that the decision was made correctly.182 The court may only
overturn an arbitration decision based on misconduct amounting to fundamental
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unfairness in the proceeding or a misapplication of the law that would be obviously
recognized by the average arbitrator.183 Still, all of these same drawbacks also
provide the stated benefits of greater speed and less cost that make arbitration a
useful alternative to litigation. Therefore, the underlying message is not that the
arbitration system needs to be revamped;184 rather, the NASD needs to make it
easier for arbitrators to accurately interpret the suitability rule and avoid blindly
relying on experts.
V. THE SIMPLE SOLUTION
The solution to the challenge of making the arbitration process more
effective in suitability cases is through an easy three-step process. First, the NASD
needs to add one simple bullet point to Rule 2310: (d) “A member shall consider
growth investments when appropriate to help clients’ achieve long-term goals such
as retirement. Growth investments necessarily include some level of risk. The
suitability of every individual growth recommendation shall be analyzed in relation
to the client’s overall portfolio.”185
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See Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. International Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568, 572-73 (2d Cir. 1968)
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Second, the NASD must require prospective arbitrators to become educated
on the revised rule before hearing their first suitability case. Currently, the
American Arbitration Association [AAA] requires everyone new to the national
roster of arbitrators to complete general requirements of both an at-home study
course and a two-day classroom training within six months of signing on to the
roster.186 Unfortunately, these education requirements mostly focus on the basic
duties and authority of the arbitrator.187 In addition, the education requirements
should include more specialized training on the particular subject matter of the
cases that will be referred to the arbitrators such as suitability.188 The solution
would be easy because the arbitrators’ suitability education and general education
requirements could be administered simultaneously.

hereinafter provided, such By-Laws, Rules of Fair Practice and changes or additions thereto as it
deems necessary or appropriate”) (emphasis added).
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Third, the NASD must keep the arbitrators’ understanding of suitability
fresh through continuing education.189 Fortunately, the AAA already includes a
continuing education requirement designed to keep arbitrators up to date with any
revisions to laws that affect arbitration.190 Still, the continuing education needs to
go deeper than to “acquaint” the arbitrator with the revised rule.191 The arbitrator
needs enhanced continuing education to acquire a clearer understanding of the
mental process that the prudent broker goes through before making an investment
recommendation. The process of implementing enhanced continuing education
with respect to suitability should be seamless because the NASD Institute at
Wharton already offers a course in “Suitability Issues.”192 In addition, continuing
education could be implemented with minimal cost if the NASD provides
arbitrators with a video of the class.
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The three-step solution will force arbitrators and securities lawyers to
address the conflicting interests that stockbrokers must weigh when making
investment recommendations. The conflicting interests consist of the downside
risk of losing capital and the risk of not meeting the investor’s future goals such as
retirement. Arbitrators will be on alert of these competing forces due to their
expanded education and the prominence of this new fourth bullet point in the
concise NASD Rule 2310.193 Securities lawyers will follow suit because they will
need to prepare to discuss the brokers’ balancing act when arguing a case. As a
result of the increased focus on growth investments, all legal professionals will be
in a better position to assess whether the broker had reasonable grounds, based on
the client’s financial situation, for any recommendations made to the client.194
To demonstrate how the solution would apply in practice, consider a 40 year
old client with only $100,000 saved. Assume the client cannot afford to save very
much going forward, can leave the money invested for a minimum of ten years,
and has the conflicting interests of being risk averse and wanting to retire at 60
years old. If the broker invests this client in Treasury notes195 because of their low
risk, then he should be subject to a suitability claim because the historically low
193
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return of these investments is not in the best interest of his client given that they
will not help him retire.
Before the recommended solution, this broker would never even have to
consider suitability because Treasury notes are very unlikely to result in financial
loss.196 Furthermore, the securities lawyer and the arbitrator would have laughed at
this case for the same reason. Today, once the solution is applied, the client’s
lawyer will suggest that he bring a suitability claim because the lawyer has heard
of the changes to NASD Rule 2310.197 The arbitrator hearing the case will
recognize that this is clearly the type of case that had caused bullet point (d) of
Rule 2310198 to be added. The arbitrator’s new education program will have
enforced this idea in his mind.199 The arbitrator will likely find for the client and
do so quickly to save everyone additional costs. This client will be left in a better
position to retire. Even more critical, this broker will make sure in the future that
he and all his broker friends place more emphasis on recommending investments
that put his clients in a better position to retire.
VI. CONCURRENT CLAIMS AND THE SOLUTION APPLIED
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
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Generally, clients do not just state a cause of action under suitability; they
also bring interrelated actions.200 Interrelated actions increase the complexity of
the suitability case, and therefore they may distract arbitrators from focusing on the
role that growth investments play in broker recommendations.
For instance, a client may choose to bring a common law claim for a breach
of fiduciary duty to enhance the strength of his suitability claim.201 When
applicable, a fiduciary duty requires the stockbroker to act with the utmost good
faith and integrity.202 A broker owes a fiduciary duty to all clients, but the extent
of that duty depends on the specific facts of the case.203 Relevant factors include
the sophistication and experience of the client204 and whether the relationship is
discretionary or non-discretionary.205 In addition, facts that demonstrate the client
placed trust in the broker’s expertise will increase the chance that a court will view
the broker as a fiduciary.206 For instance, in our hypothetical, the client failed to
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look at his statement for five years. This fact points towards the view that the
client had placed complete faith in his broker.
A breach of fiduciary duty often occurs when a broker has an ongoing
relationship with a client and fails to address the client’s change in financial
circumstances or investment objectives.207 Material changes to the client’s
financial situation must be documented and the broker must re-assess the client’s
investments for suitability upon learning of the new information.208 For instance,
returning to our hypothetical, imagine after six months of being invested in the
aggressive growth mutual funds, you tell your broker that you plan to get married
within a year and will need $25,000 of the $150,000 investment to pay for the
wedding. After learning this information, your broker has a fiduciary obligation to
review whether either the wedding or the ensuing marriage impacts your
portfolio’s suitability.209
Your broker should first inquire whether marriage itself has changed your
investment goals or desired risk tolerance for your portfolio.210 For instance, you
may wish to have your investment strategy become more consistent with that of
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your fiancée’s.211 However, even assuming you do not change your overall
outlook, the broker must still reassess his recommendations given that you have
now expressed two contrasting investment objectives: a long-term and a short-term
goal.212
Upon analysis, your broker will likely determine that investing $125,000 in
growth investments still seems to be a wise choice because your long-term goal has
not changed for these funds.213 As a result, your broker does not necessarily need
to reallocate the $125,000, and thus he has no new suitability obligations for this
portion of the portfolio.214 On the other hand, the broker should recognize that
your objective has changed for the remaining portion of your portfolio.215 You
have a short-term goal to preserve $25,000 for wedding expenses and thus growth
investments that were once suitable, now seem to be too risky.216
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In light of your new financial circumstances, the broker should consider
selling some of the aggressive mutual funds217 to preserve capital.218 However, it
is not necessarily true that he must reallocate the portfolio to meet his fiduciary
obligation.219 This may not even be the wisest strategy. For instance, before
selling any of the funds, he should analyze the tax consequences and early
redemption costs.220 Furthermore, in this case, the broker should consider that
even without reallocation and regardless of market conditions, you will likely have
$25,000 at the end of the year to pay for your wedding expenses.221 Thus, paying
for your wedding does not mandate shifting $25,000 into a capital preservation
strategy.222 In addition, the broker should take into account whether you are down
from your initial investment because shifting $25,000 towards capital preservation
at this time may in fact be taking away from the overall goal of retiring.223 In
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essence, a prudent stockbroker’s recommendation may be that you should not
change the portfolio at all to stay on track for retirement.224 Thus, arbitrators
reviewing this hypothetical case should find the broker met his fiduciary duty as
long as he documented the client’s change in circumstances, regardless of whether
he suggested changes to the portfolio.225 Because this decision is not intuitive from
reading the recommended new bullet point of NASD Rule 2310, this analysis
should be taught to arbitrators through the recommended education program.226
In contrast to the above hypothetical facts, assume the upcoming wedding
expenses amounted to a high percentage of the client’s portfolio such that
aggressive investments risked the client having sufficient funds to pay for the
wedding. In that case, arbitrators should find that for the broker to meet his
fiduciary duty, he must recommend reallocating the majority of the portfolio to
more suitable short-term investments given the client’s adjusted time horizon.227
Once again, arbitrators should learn this subtle distinction through the
recommended education program.228
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The next common method of breaching a fiduciary duty is for the broker to
fail to monitor the client’s portfolio on an ongoing basis. In cases of an ongoing
relationship, the client will often reasonably expect the stockbroker to monitor the
client’s positions. In earlier brokerage days, brokers had a major incentive to
monitor the portfolios because coming up with new positions to sell and buy
helped them get paid through commissions.229 The transition of the industry from
a commission based structure into fee based compensation provides the broker
with different incentives to monitor the portfolio.230
Under a fee based compensation plan, the broker’s incentive is to increase
the value of the client’s portfolio which in turn will increase the dollar value
associated with the broker’s percentage compensation. For instance, you hire a
broker to manage your $100,000 portfolio and agree to compensate the broker
1.5% of the entire portfolio. In Year One, the broker makes 1.5% of $100,000 or
$1,500. After the first year, the value of your portfolio increases to $110,000.
Now, in Year Two, the broker has increased his compensation to 1.5% of $110,000
or $1,650. This example demonstrates that stockbrokers and clients are on the
same side under fee based compensation plans. However, paradoxically, that does
not mean that the broker has a significant enough incentive that he will actively
229
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monitor your portfolio. The reason for this paradox is that there is an opportunity
cost for the broker in monitoring your diversified portfolio rather than utilizing that
time to solicit new business.
On the one hand, the incentive to closely monitor your portfolio is minimal
because active portfolio management has not proven to significantly outperform
simple passively managed strategies such as index funds.231 Conversely, the
incentive for soliciting new business is high because stockbrokers can utilize
similar investment strategies with each new client that they add on. A broker will
often choose to spend his time soliciting new business because a newly acquired
client allows him to increase revenues with little exertion of energy. These
developments in the brokerage industry provide another opportunity for the
recommended education program to provide arbitrators with the necessary
background knowledge to make an informed decision in a suitability case.232
B. Related Causes of Action
There are a couple of additional claims that clients will often bring in
conjunction with suitability claims and their relevance should be explained in the
continuing education program.233 First, the client will likely bring a claim for
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failure to supervise against the brokerage firm, unless the case clearly involves a
broker deviating from the standard practices of the firm.234 However, the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provide brokerage
firms with safe harbor provisions under which the firm is not held responsible if
the firm acted in good faith, had no knowledge or reasonable ground to believe in
the facts that would otherwise make it liable, or followed established supervisory
procedures reasonably expected to be effective.235 These safe harbors put the
brokerage firm at odds with the stockbroker, and yet the same lawyer often
represents both parties.236 This conflict of interest, combined with the focus on
financial loss in suitability cases,237 serves as a major disincentive for the broker
who desires to help his client retire by recommending the necessary level of
growth for his portfolio.
Second, clients sometimes bring a common law cause of action for
negligence. Negligence alone does not suffice for a client to have a valid cause of
action, but it may be brought concurrently with a suitability claim, and may serve
234

See NASD Arbitration & Mediation: Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 12 (listing
“failure to supervise” as one of the interrelated controversies in arbitration cases).
235
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2002); see also Pete S. Michaels & Derek C. Anderson, A Case
Study of Two Hedge Funds: A Regulatory Framework and Its Lessons for the Broker-Dealer
Litigator, 1503 PLI/CORP 259, 270 (2005) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2005)).
236
R. Gina Renee, How to Survive in Arbitration Nation, available at
http://www.researchxtra.com/uploads/features/2006/0601_fs_cover_arbitration.asp (last visited
April 23, 2006) (quoting Thomas O’Keefe, President of the National Association of Investment
Professionals: “Brokers getting sued like this think that their firm’s attorney represents them:
They need to realize that the big firms . . . are the defense attorney’s customer . . . ”).
237
Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34; see also supra text accompanying note 46.
58

as evidence of whether the broker was reasonable under NASD 2310.238 Although
actual negligence provides evidence of a broker’s wrongdoing, arbitrators and
lawyers may mistakenly believe the broker was negligent when the broker was
merely factoring in the client’s need for growth.239
VII. DAMAGES
Once a client proves that a stockbroker has made unsuitable
recommendations, the arbitrators must decide how much to assess in damages.
Section 28a of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 limits recovery to actual
damages.240 The main theory for assessing damages for suitability actions is the
out of pocket model241 which compensates the client for the actual losses sustained
during the time the client held unsuitable investments.242 Unfortunately, this
method does not accurately assess the client’s true damages because actual losses
do not equate to actual damages.
In many cases, regardless of whether the client made or lost money, the
broker will have made unsuitable investments because he departed in some manner
from the appropriate asset allocation model. However, the out of pocket model
fails to take this into account because it does not consider market appreciation or
238
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depreciation. The theory compensates the client for all losses, not just those
attributable to the unsuitable investments. As a result, clients that lose money due
to unsuitable investments are often over-compensated under this approach.
Another strategy for assessing damages that has been proposed is the loss of
bargain recovery model which compensates a client for the money that he would
have earned had the money not been mismanaged.243 Regrettably, the reluctance to
consider market performance in assessing damages has led to the concern that
bargain theory recovery damages are too speculative.244 Although some courts
have acknowledged the possibility that clients could be entitled to lost profits
under the right circumstances, 245 few courts have awarded damages under the loss
of bargain theory.246 Therefore, clients that receive recommendations that are too
conservative based on their investment objectives may not have a legal recourse to
obtain adequate compensation. This problem may arise even in cases where the
broker’s unsuitable recommendations kept the clients from meeting their future
needs.
243
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Despite the fear that intertwining damages with the stock market is too
speculative, market indexes should help provide specific measures that can be tied
to the proper asset allocation. Index returns are published, and thus no speculation
is involved in obtaining these figures. It is true that the proper asset allocation for
the client may be hard to distinguish between fine lines such as aggressive, and
moderately aggressive. However, experts can make recommendations of the
appropriate asset allocation level and arbitrators can ultimately make that
decision.247 The fair level of damages for all cases in which recommending asset
allocation was appropriate should be the difference, over the apt time period,
between the client’s actual market performance and the appropriate index’s
performance as determined by the arbitrators.248 For example, if the arbitration
board determines that the client’s proper asset allocation would have been
approximately a 50% equity and 50% bond portfolio, then pre-determined equity
and bond indexes should be utilized to calculate the client’s portfolio had it been
invested properly.
An award for damages should put the client back in the position he would
have been in had the broker provided suitable recommendations instead of the
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unsuitable recommendations.249 This approach implies that it should not make a
difference whether the client lost or made money in the market. The question
merely becomes what was the deviation in performance between the unsuitable
portfolio and a properly managed portfolio. Therefore, there should be no
distinction between the out of pocket model and the loss of bargain model, but
rather one model that assesses market performance in relation to the client’s actual
returns. Yet again, the recommended education program can explain to arbitrators
the process for accurately assessing damages.250
VIII. CONCLUSION
Growth investments refer to a wide variety of equity strategies all designed
for a client to achieve higher portfolio performance, while taking on some risk. A
prudent stockbroker utilizes growth investments to help clients meet future needs
such as the universal, yet challenging, goal of retirement. When growth
investments are utilized in relation to a diversified strategy and meet a client’s
objectives, a supervisor at a brokerage firm will often find the investments to be
suitable.
Accordingly, arbitrators should focus on the need for growth in clients’
portfolios when evaluating the suitability of investments and interrelated claims
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such as breach of fiduciary duty. The importance of growth investments may not
only explain how prudent advice led to a client’s financial loss, but it also may
help arbitrators understand why the broker might have felt there was a need to take
on some risk in the first place.
In addition, lawyers serving as advocates in arbitration proceedings have a
duty to emphasize the need for growth investments in their arguments when
appropriate. Securities lawyers should recognize that brokerage firms may have a
valid defense that the recommended investments were proper in light of the client’s
need for growth in his portfolio. On the other hand, lawyers should advise
prospective clients that they are not limited to bringing suitability cases for
financial loss. Lawyers should inform clients that they may also have a case when
they indicated a preference for growth and their investments were allocated too
conservatively.
In any case, the speed and finality of the arbitration process and the
inexperience of arbitrators make it especially important for all legal professionals
working in the securities industry to have a clear understanding of the need for
growth in a client’s portfolio. This clear understanding is necessary to avoid the
otherwise inevitable misapplication of liability and damages in suitability cases.
Therefore, the NASD should add a bullet point to the suitability rule. It would
clarify how the need to invest for growth impacts whether a broker had reasonable
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grounds to make a particular recommendation. In addition, the NASD should take
steps to ensure that arbitrators familiarize themselves with the applications of this
rule. Ultimately, if arbitrators determine the recommended investments were
unsuitable given the client’s circumstances and investment objectives, damages
should be assessed in relation to the appropriate market index, regardless of
whether the client’s portfolio increased or decreased in value.
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